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Introduction
The owners of big rms usually have to hire managers in order to run the business. Managers, however, have their own interests and choose decisions depending on the incentives given by the compensation contracts. This unavoidably implies that the compensation schemes oered by the owners strategically inuence the operational decisions of their managers and hence the prots of the rms. In the theory of Industrial Organization, these strategic eects are derived by applying models of two-stage games where owners simultaneously oer performance-related compensation contracts in the rst stage and managers simultaneously decide on prices or quantities in the second stage. Vickers (1985) , Sklivas (1987) and Judd (1987, 2006) have been the rst to analyze the consequences of strategic manager compensation in homogeneous markets. They assumed that the compensation contracts consist of xed salaries and performance-dependent payments related to rm prots on the one hand and revenues (or equivalently sales) on the other hand. The managers maximize the performance-dependent payments by choosing optimal quantities. The main result of these models is that, due to the strategic eects, the incentives of the managers are biased: they decide to produce more than the rm owners would if no managers were involved.
This basic framework has been extended in several dimensions. First, other possible compensation contracts have been considered where revenues are replaced by market shares (see, e.g., Jansen et al. 2007 , Kopel and Lambertini 2013 , and Ritz 2008 or by relative prots (see, e.g., Salas Fumas 1992, Aggarwal and Samwick 1999 , Chirco et al. 2011 , and Miller and Pazgal 2001 . For the duopoly case, a comparison of the dierent compensation contracts has been provided by Jansen et al. (2009 Jansen et al. ( , 2012 . Second, mixed markets have been studied where some rms are governed by managers while others are run by the owners themselves (see, e.g., Basu 1995 and Tseng 2001) . Third, Spagnolo (2000) has considered a supergame with innitely repeated competition to analyze dynamic compensation schemes based on the shareholder values of the rms.
This paper aims to concentrate on the role of common large shareholders such as mutual or index funds which coordinate the design of their manager compensation schemes.
Fund companies such as Blackrock, Vanguard, or We refer to 'common holdings' if some shareholders, e.g. index funds, are invested CalPERS certainly hold shares of multiple rms competing in a relevant product market. A forteriori, index funds duplicate the entire stock market as represented by major stock indices like the S&P500, Nikkei, or DAX. Because of their common business model, even funds of dierent fund companies are invested in the same sample of rms. The obvious consequence of such a common holding is that the shareholders involved coordinate the design of the compensation contracts for the managers of the rms in which they are invested. Index funds experience a fast growing popularity. According to Bogle (2016, 9) , they have accounted for 160% of net cash ows into equity mutual funds. Due to the increasing importance of mutual funds, most notably index funds, our topic is high on the research agenda.
Regardless of the role of institutional investors, and without referring to managerial incentives, the relevance of coordinated behavior in case of common and cross holdings has been intensively discussed in another strand of the literature. Reynolds and Snapp (1986) and Breshnahan and Salop (1986) have identied the incentives to mitigate competition in case of cross holdings. Some models deal with the eects of common ownership in innitely repeated games. Common ownerships interact with general incentives to collude. According to Gilo et al. (2006) , the stability of collusion subtly depends on the dierent amounts of cross holdings within an industry. An increase in cross holdings, however, always increases the stability of collusion. Additionally, they investigate the role of a controller who internalizes the interest of minority shareholders (not participating in the cross holdings). Given this controller, the stability of collusion may diminish in case of an increased cross holding. The latter point has been strengthened by DeHaas and Paha (2016) who have shown that this result continues to hold under a wider range of conditions. One of the most comprehensive approaches has been provided by Azar (2017) . In his model, agents include consumers, workers, and shareholders, where the formers are also shareholders. Firms are run by managers whose objective is to maximize approval votes for new strategic plans. Due to this unusual assumption, it is hard to compare the results to the traditional models on that topic. Antón et al. (2018) have set up a model of product market competition with owners and managers. In contrast to our model, however, they assume that the performance-dependent payments in in the same sample of rms. In contrast, 'cross holdings' means that rm i holds some shares of rm j and vice versa. In case of common holdings, in addition to the institutional investors, there are usually 'minority shareholders' without any control on the respective rms' decisions. the compensation schemes are restricted to the uncertain rm prots only. Thus, there is no strategic distortion of manager incentives at work. Nevertheless, an increasing degree of common holdings induces less steep managerial incentive schemes, thus leading to less intensive competition in the product market.
Given the increasing importance of equity funds, it is hardly surprising that a growing empirical literature on the topic has emerged. A rst line of research addresses the competition eects of substantial common holdings. Referring to common ownership by a small set of institutional investors, Azar et al. (2018) have tackled the question empirically by investigating the U.S. airline market. They nd evidence for the hypothesis that commonly held rms induce additional price premia in addition to what should be expected, given the traditional Herndahl index of market concentration. The results seem to be robust although they are being disputed to some extent (see, e.g., O'Brian and Waehrer 2017 and Azar et al. 2017) . He and Huang (2017) present empirical evidence that cross-holdings foster explicit forms of product market coordination such as joint ventures, strategic alliances and intra-industry acquisitions. Using data from the U.S. banking market, have developed a generalized Herndahl concentration measure by accounting for common holdings as well as cross holdings and are able to show that both types of holdings induce softer competition.
A second line of empirical research is concerned with the corporate governance implications of institutional investors. McCahery et al. (2016) have presented a survey on the role of institutional investors in corporate governance. One of their main ndings is that the decisive triggers for interventions from institutional investors are governance and strategy. This is the issue we deeply want to emphasize with our study. Cvijanovic et al. (2016) have found that mutual funds regularly support management proposals except for compensation proposals. Even though these papers highlight the level of compensation rather than its structure, the idea that mutual funds intervene in management compensation and strategic aspects strongly supports the relevance of our research question.
Finally, our topic has direct consequences for antitrust authorities and competition law. Recently, the German Monopolies Commission has expressed concerns about competition-reducing eects of increasing cross holdings induced by institutional investors (see Monopolkommission 2016, note S24). In the U.S., several legal scholars have debated necessary amendments to antitrust law. Posner et al. (2017) suggest a limitation of institutional inves-tors' ownership to either not more than 1% of the total size of an industry or only one single rm per industry. Funds committing to strict passivity should be excepted from this rule. Elhauge (2016) pleads instead for a stricter case-by-case analysis on the basis of the current law. Baker (2016) questions the operability of the latter proposal. Lambert and Sykuta (2018, 2) come to the conclusion: "The prevailing view among the antitrust elite thus seems to be (1) that common holdings by institutional investors signicantly diminish competition in oligopolistic industries, and (2) that additional antitrust intervention is appropriate to prevent competitive harm. ... We believe that even if competition were softened by institutional investors' common ownership of small minority interests in competing rms, the unintended negative consequences of an antitrust x would outweigh any benets from such intervention."
To investigate the eects of common holdings and shareholder coordination on managerial incentives and hence product market competition in a satisfying but still tractable way, we extend the basic management compensation model in several directions. First, to allow for a more complex market structure, we consider the case of a triopoly instead of the much simpler case of a duopoly. This enables us to study an ownership structure where two rms are commonly owned by coordinating shareholders while the shareholders of the third rm are not involved in that coordination. Second, to take into account the empirical evidence that major stock indices consist of the biggest rms, we introduce asymmetric unit costs of the rms as the source of asymmetric rm sizes. Such an extension to asymmetric rm structures is interesting in its own right. Furthermore, it enables us to analyze a scenario where the index funds coordinate the behavior of the two bigger index rms while the smaller, outside rm is not part of the index. Third, in case of a homogeneous market, coordinating shareholders would take a less ecient rm out of the market. To exclude this possibility, we consider a heterogeneous market. To sum up, we deal with a heterogeneous triopoly market, where the output decisions are delegated to managers who are compensated by optimized contracts and who have to run rms of dierent sizes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic assumptions and the structure of the model. As a benchmark case, Section 3 studies the model with common holdings but without coordination of shareholders. Section 4 extends the analysis to the case of coordination by index fund shareholders and compares the results to the basic scenario. Section 5 summarizes the main results and concludes the paper. In order to study more complex ownership structures, we consider a product market with three rms i = 1, 2, 3, each producing a substitute good. Since almost all real markets are characterized by an intermediate degree of product dierentiation, we assume that the market is heterogeneous and the preferences of consumers with mass 1 can be captured by the quasi-linear quadratic utility function
where q i , i = 1, 2, 3, are the quantities of the dierentiated products supplied by the three rms and q 0 > 0 is the quantity of the numéraire good. Substituting q 0 from the budget constraint I = q 0 +p 1 q 1 +p 2 q 2 +p 3 q 3 and maximizing the utility function with respect to the quantities gives the inverse demand system
where Q ≡ q 1 + q 2 + q 3 is the quantity produced by the rms altogether. To allow for dierent rm sizes, which will prove to be important in the case of common shareholders, we assume constant but dierent unit costs c i of the rms. In order to keep the model tractable, we follow Barros (1998) in assuming equal dierences in the unit costs such that
where δ ≥ 0 indicates the degree of asymmetry. To guarantee that all rms realize nonnegative prots in the triopoly market, we have to assume that the unit cost dierences are not too large and restrict them to the interval This is a special case of the quasi-linear quadratic utility function
3 ) + 2γ(q 1 q 2 + q 1 q 3 + q 2 q 3 )], 0 ≤ γ ≤ β, where β = 2 and γ = 1 indicate intermediate heterogeneity. The limit case of a homogeneous market would be characterized by γ = β, the opposite limit case of three separated monopoly markets would be captured by γ = 0. 6 0 ≤ δ/µ ≤ 13/28 ≈ 0.4643 where µ ≡ α − c is an appropriate measure of market size. This leads to the rms' gross prots
depending on the basic market conditions α, c, and δ. Managers are awarded according to the contracts oered by the owners. We follow Judd (1987, 2006) and assume simple contracts implying the linear payments
f i denotes the xed salary for the manager of rm i, b i > 0 serves as a weight parameter which, in combination with f i , guarantees that the total payments s i to each manager are equal to a given market-specic payment s.
, is the performance-dependent payment as a weighted sum of the performance measures prot π i and revenue p i q i . This specication leads to the managers' objective functions ψ i = π i +κ i c i q i , whereκ i is the strategic contract parameter set by the owner of rm i. For convenience we dene the transformed strategic parameters κ i ≡κ i c i to obtain the performance-dependent manager payments
Manager delegation is modeled as a strategic two-stage game, where owners simultaneously write observable compensation contracts with the strategic variables κ i in the rst stage and managers simultaneously choose production quantities q i in the second stage. ! While owners aim to maximize the rm prots (3), the managers aim to maximize the performance-dependent payments (4). ! Quantity competition can be regarded as a reduced form of competition by capacity choice with subsequent price competition, as in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) for the case of homogeneous markets and in Maggi (1996) for the generalized case of heterogeneous markets.
3 Common Holdings without Owner Coordination
As a benchmark, we start our analysis by considering the case of manager delegation without owner coordination. In the second stage of the game, the managers decide on quantities q i , given the (transformed) contract parameters κ i . The maximization of (4) with respect to the quantities leads to a system of three linear rst-order conditions which can be solved in terms of the quantities
These quantities imply the gross prot functions of the rms
In the rst stage of the game, since managers' total payment s i =s is xed, the rm owners maximize the prot functions (6) with respect to the contract parameters κ i . In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the rst-order conditions consist of the system of linear reaction functions
which can be solved in terms of the strategic owner decisions
Obviously, these contract parameters indicate biased compensation schemes.
"
Given these compensation contracts, managers choose the production " According to the basic taxonomy of business strategies (see, e.g., Tirole 1988, Chapter 8) , this represents an example of an aggressive top-dog strategy of the owners. 
Comparative statics show that the quantities and prots are increasing in the market size µ = α − c. The degree of cost asymmetry δ has a positive impact on the quantities and prots of the most ecient rm 1 and a negative impact on the quantities and prots of the least ecient rm 3, whereas there is no inuence on the performance of rm 2.
The welfare in the market is dened as the sum of the producer surplus Both measures are increasing in the market size µ and the degree of cost asymmetry δ.
Common Holdings and Owner Coordination
In order to capture the inuence of a coordinated owner behavior, we assume that the bigger rms 1 and 2 are owned by index fund shareholders. This implies that these owners have an incentive to cooperate in specifying their managers' contracts while the managers compete in quantities as before. The index fund shareholders of the rms 1 and 2 maximize their common prot π 1 + π 2 in (6) with respect to the contract variables κ 1 and κ 2 while the owners of rm 3 maximize the prot π 3 in (6) as before. The corresponding rst-order conditions consist of the system of reaction functions
which are solved in terms of the subgame perfect contract variables
implying the managers' quantity decisions the welfare amounts to
In addition to the number of rms and the degree of heterogeneity, which are given in our model, there are two decisive explanatory factors determining # Remarkably, while the contract parameters generally are strategic substitutes, they prove to be strategic complements in the relation between each inside rm and the outside rm. rm behavior and performance: the rst is the ownership structure leading to a (partial) coordination in the design of the compensation contracts, the second is the rms' unit cost asymmetry. To separate these two determinants, we will rst discuss the results for identical unit costs, i.e. δ = 0, in order to identify the strategic eects in isolation. Afterwards, we will analyze the overall results by additionally taking into account the technological asymmetry. The results are summarized in Table 1 . Let us start with the case of symmetric rms, i.e. δ = 0. Whenever we refer to numerical values, we normalize the market size variable µ = α − c to one without loss of generality. Indeed, as can be seen from Table 1 , the results continue to qualitatively hold for all values µ > 0.
The coordination between index fund shareholders leads to less intensive competition between the rms because the strategic eects of manager compensation are mitigated when they are internalized by the coordinated rms. The coordinating shareholders now choose an inoensive puppy-dog strategy in designing the compensation contracts (κ Remarkably, the prot gain of rm 3 even exceeds the joint prot gains of the coordinated rms. This is a reminiscence of an important result which is well-known from the merger literature: the merging rms slightly increase their prots while the non-merging rms experience an even higher increase of their prots (see Salant et al. 1983) .
Evidently, the decline of the trade volume reduces the consumer surplus (from CS * = 0.1913 to CS * * = 0.1601) as well as the welfare (from W * = 0.3444 to W * * = 0.3287) in the market.
Shareholder Coordination with Asymmetric Firms
The coordination eects of index fund shareholders become more interesting when we additionally allow for cost dierences between rms (δ > 0). Since index fund shareholders are typically invested in the bigger index rms (here rms 1 and 2), we assume that the outside rm (rm 3) is the smallest one. The technological asymmetry oers a further option for a reallocation of production between the coordinated rms. Of course, production quantities and rm prots can be moved from the less ecient rm 2 to the most ecient rm 1. Table 1 summarizes the results in terms of the market size parameter µ > 0 and the parameter 0 ≤ δ ≤ (13/28)µ ≈ 0.4643µ which measures the size of cost asymmetry. A comparison of the strategic decisions on the contract designs shows that the inequalities
continue to hold true. However, the technological dierences induce the index fund shareholders to design compensation contracts, providing the ma-nager of the most ecient rm 1 with an incentive to act more aggressively and the manager of the less ecient rm 2 to act even more inoensive. The consequence is that some production is moved from rm 2 to rm 1. A comparison of the managers' quantity decisions showes that the relations
generally hold. For all feasible δ-values, the prot relations prove to be π Of course, an implication of the reallocation of production is that the protability of rm 1 further increases. The low prot of the least ecient outside rm 3 still increases as a consequence of shareholder coordination. The overall coordination eect on the prot of rm 2 can be positive or negative, depending on the size of cost dierences. In case of small unit cost dierences, (δ/µ) ≤ 0.1539, its prot goes up due to the less aggressive behavior of both coordinated rms. However, in case of large unit cost dierences, (δ/µ) > 0.1539, the coordination of the index fund shareholders drives its prot down.
This result reects a basic conict between institutional investors invested in rms 1 and 2 and minority shareholders being solely invested in rm 2. Of course, the minority shareholders of rm 2 are not interested in shifting quantities to rm 1. The relevance of this eect is further strengthened by the fact that institutional investors usually act in a well organized manner while small investors often prefer not to participate in general meetings.
Finally, it generally holds for all feasible δ-values that CS * * < CS * and W * * < W * , i.e., shareholder cooperation reduces the consumer surplus as well as the welfare in the market. While rms benet from a less aggressive compensation scheme, consumers suer from a loss of surplus due to shareholder coordination. The reduction in welfare is less severe when there are cost dierences. Accordingly, the increase of overall prots declines with increasing cost dierences. Since the latter eect is stronger than the former one, the reduction in welfare increases in the cost dierences.
Summary and Conclusion
In many markets, bigger rms are to a considerable extent commonly owned by institutional investors like index funds while smaller rms are owned by independent shareholders. Given such a common-holding ownership structure, the index funds have an incentive to coordinate in designing their manager compensation schemes.
This paper studied the consequences of such a coordination by analyzing an asymmetric triopoly where the two biggest rms are owned by an index fund and the smallest rm by independent shareholders. We showed that this type of collusion leads to compensation contracts which make the managers less aggressive such that the rms involved in the coordination reduce their production while the outside rm increases its output. This reallocation of production induces a redistribution of the prots: the outside rm and the most ecient rm owned by the index funds gain from the coordination while the less ecient rm owned by the index funds might suer from a loss of prots when the cost dierences are large.
The total output in the market is reduced such that shareholder coordination is detrimental to consumer surplus as well as welfare. Therefore, the neglect of index funds in previous models of strategic manager compensation may lead to serious shortcomings of the theory. Our results conrm the concerns about coordination activities of index funds with common holdings. This coordination behavior induces crucial implications with respect to reduced competition and redistributed rm prots in the product markets.
